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Abstract: Through examples of embodied and learning-centered pedagogy, 
we discuss transformative learning of transgressive topics. We begin with a 
taxonomy of types of learning our students undergo as they resolve incon-
sistencies among their pre-existing beliefs and the material they confront in 
our course on feminist ethics and epistemology. We then discuss ways to help 
students maximize their learning while confronting internal inconsistencies. 
While we focus on feminist topics, our approach is broad enough to be relevant 
to anyone teaching a transgressive or controversial topic.
Students hold beliefs and values that conflict with many of the ideas 
expressed in the texts we use in our feminist ethics and epistemology 
course. The tension caused by this conflict, which we characterize 
as a type of incoherence, presents students with particular learning 
challenges.1 In what follows, our first aim is to report our attempt to 
better understand these learning challenges so that we could properly 
evaluate the merits of possible pedagogies relative to student needs. 
Our attempt resulted in the taxonomy of learning that we present. 
Specifically, we differentiate additive from evaluative learning. Within 
evaluative learning we distinguish transformative from confirmative 
learning. Our second aim is to offer some examples of and reflections 
on the pedagogies we created to help students learn accurately despite 
the challenges we identify as associated with transformatively resolving 
the incoherence they experience among their pre-existing beliefs/values 
and the transgressive material they confront in our feminist ethics and 
epistemology class. In the end, we define, recommend, and provide 
examples of pedagogies that are embodied and learning-centered. We 
argue that these pedagogies enable and support students as they revise 
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some of their pre-existing understandings. While we focus on feminist 
topics, our approach is broad enough to be relevant to any teacher of a 
course that addresses a transgressive topic, and particularly relevant to 
teachers of courses that emphasize “controversial” topics (e.g., critical 
race theory, queer theory, Marxism, etc.). 
Additive and Evaluative Learning 
Constructivist educational theory reveals that people learn by assimi-
lating new beliefs and/or values into what they already believe and/or 
value.2 We understand this assimilation as taking one of two primary 
forms. In the first primary form, additive learning, the newly encoun-
tered beliefs or values are experienced by the learner as cohering with 
the learner’s pre-existing beliefs and values.3 
The second primary form of learning is evaluative. In evaluative 
learning the pre-existing understandings of a person are incoherent or 
felt by the learner to be in conflict with newly encountered beliefs and 
values. Students experience this incoherence when we discuss com-
pulsory and differential body comportment as one facet of oppression. 
In “Throwing Like a Girl,” Iris Marion Young argues that under many 
current patriarchies women tend to be trained not to make full use of 
their body’s spatial potential; feminine movement is timid, uncertain, 
and hesitant, and women are taught to underestimate their capacities.4 
This feminine body comportment is part of what Marilyn Frye calls 
“sex marking” and “sex announcing.”5 When a person comports her-
self in a feminine manner she announces that she is a woman and is 
thus more easily marked by others trying to determine the gender of 
unknown others. Because oppression is easier when those who would 
be oppressed are easily distinguished from those who would not be 
oppressed, sex marking and sex announcing facilitate oppression. 
What Young and Frye agree on is that how people carry themselves is 
largely socially constructed and that most people move in manly and 
womanly ways, often without any awareness of the gendered aspects 
of their comportment. 
For many of the students in our feminist ethics and epistemology 
course the notion that how they carry themselves is partially or largely 
socially constructed does not generate significant tension. Nearly all 
of our students, however, do experience incoherence when they attend 
directly to the ethical response they believe they should deliver in 
response to the link Young and Frye argue exists between body com-
portment and oppression. Many women in our class feel uncomfortably 
exposed or alternatively “bitchy” when they intentionally occupy more 
space than they typically do. Some of the women in our class cannot 
own the space they feel they rightfully should. Conversely, many of 
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the men in our class are uncomfortable giving up space. As one male 
student put it: “It’s authentically me that enjoys being big and there is 
nothing wrong with me being comfortable in my skin, so why shouldn’t 
I take up as much space as I need to be comfortable? I don’t want to 
be sexist, but how is my taking up lots of space oppressing women?” 
The view that how one, for example, sits can be an expression and 
reinscription of sexist norms could not simply be added to most of 
our students’ belief and value sets, which appear to have contained 
the belief that gendered differences in how people use physical space 
are value neutral. 
We believe there are two ways to resolve tensions between pre-
existing understandings and newly encountered beliefs or values and 
thus two sub-types of evaluative learning. We call the first type of 
evaluative learning confirmative. In confirmative learning after due con-
sideration a person rejects newly encountered beliefs or values without 
revising any pre-exiting understandings. It is important to stress that as 
an instance of evaluative learning, where a person is evaluating beliefs 
that cannot fit together in an attempt to establish felt coherence among 
the beliefs she endorses, confirmative learning is not the non-learning 
of a person who refuses to consider new information as soon as s/he 
realizes that it initially appears not to fit with her pre-existing beliefs 
and/or values. In such a case of non-learning no evaluation occurs. In 
sincerely confirmative learning the learner’s belief and/or value set does 
not significantly change but careful weighing, with the possibility of 
abandoning or revising pre-existing beliefs, does occur. 
Transformative Learning
In contrast to confirmative learning where a felt incoherence between 
pre-existing understandings and new information is resolved by not 
incorporating the new information into one’s endorsed (as opposed 
to unreflectively held) belief and value set, in transformative learning 
some alteration of one’s pre-existing belief and/or value set occurs.6 
We distinguish between systemic and partial transformative learning. 
Partial transformative learning occurs when a person achieves a felt 
coherence within her belief/value set by replacing some number of pre-
existing understandings with newly encountered beliefs and/or values. 
Given that many beliefs and/or values are mutually supportive with 
regard to the coherence of a person’s belief/value set, it is likely that 
most partial transformative learning involves a plurality of beliefs and/
or values. Instantaneous or even rapid systemic transformative learning, 
where in a moment or a matter of a few days a person rejects nearly 
all of her/his pre-existing understandings while replacing them with 
another set of beliefs and values, probably never occurs. If such a mo-
180 DAVID W. CONCEPCIÓN AND JULI THORSON EFLIN
ment were to occur, it is likely to be thought of more as a psychotic 
break than as a moment of transformative learning. Nevertheless, over 
a sometimes relatively short amount of time it is possible for a person 
to undergo such extensive partial transformative learning that the cu-
mulative effect is properly called systemic. We think of these dramatic 
changes as paradigm shifts. Unlike its original use by Thomas Kuhn, 
where one ontology and/or method for gaining knowledge is rejected 
wholesale and replaced with another by a bulk of working scientists, 
the “paradigm shift” we have in mind occurs within individuals.7 Based 
on their writings and oral arguments in other courses we believe that 
at the beginning of the term most of our students would self-identify 
as non-feminist, politically moderate or left-leaning classical liber-
als. This majority is joined by a small number of students we believe 
would identify as what Rosemarie Tong would call liberal feminists.8 
By semester’s end nearly every student explicitly self-identifies as 
feminist, many of them as radical feminists. Insofar as these explicit 
identifications accurately represent changes in the belief and value 
sets of the students in our feminist ethics and epistemology course, 
most of them experience significant transformative learning and a few 
experience what we characterize as a paradigm shift. A student who 
completed the course over two years ago referred to it as “the course 
that changed my life.”9
We find it helpful to envision the types of learning we have thus 
far described as being on a continuum relative to how much unlearn-
ing, or alteration of pre-existing understandings, occurs. Unlearning is 
coming to disbelieve what you had once been taught was true, either 
explicitly through formal education or implicitly through socialization. 
Pure additive learning is on the minimal unlearning pole and systemic 
transformative learning is on the maximal unlearning pole:
Types of Learning
(1) Additive
(2) Evaluative Evaluative Evaluative
 Confirmative Transformative (Partial) Transformative (Systemic)
 Minimal Unlearning Maximal Unlearning
We recognize that lived experience can rarely be portrayed in a simple 
chart and this is no exception. Many instances of unlearning are simul-
taneously partially additive, confirmative, and transformative.
An alternative chart might stress the amount of learning or quanti-
tative increase to a person’s belief/value set that occurs, with minimal 
learning on the left. In such a schema confirmative learning would be 
to the far left insofar as it produces no new members to a would-be 
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learner’s belief/value set beyond the new belief that one has confirmed 
some number of pre-existing beliefs. Further, inasmuch as some in-
stances of additive learning increase the number of new members of 
a learner’s belief/value set more than some instances of partial trans-
formative learning, some instances of additive learning would need to 
be further to the right than some instances of transformative learning. 
Unlike such an alternative “learning” schema, our chart stresses the 
amount of “unlearning,” or revising and abandoning of pre-existing 
understandings, that occurs, with the maximum amount of unlearning 
to the right. To learn transformatively is simultaneously to unlearn. 
Highly Transformative Learning
Given the course content we present and their backgrounds, most of 
the students in our Midwestern university experience some transforma-
tive learning in our feminist ethics and epistemology course. Some of 
them change so significantly that we characterize their experience as a 
paradigm shift. To further clarify, these experiences of transformative 
learning are matters of degree both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Quantitatively, sometimes a person needs to revise or abandon 
only a small number of pre-existing beliefs or values to (re)achieve 
a comfortable felt level of coherence among pre-existing understand-
ings and newly discovered ideas; other times s/he may need to revise 
a large number of beliefs. Sometimes transformative learning involves 
considerable unlearning while other times only minimal unlearning is 
necessary. 
Qualitatively, sometimes the beliefs or values a person needs to 
revise are relatively unimportant to her or him; other times a person 
must revise dearly held beliefs. Sometimes the pre-existing under-
standings that are problematized by new experiences are peripheral to 
a student’s understanding of self and the world. Other times the pre-
existing understandings are central to a person’s understanding and 
self-valuing. It can be emotionally very difficult to sacrifice central 
pre-existing understandings. Put another way, there is great variety 
among students relative to what they have at stake in unlearning certain 
beliefs and values. It can hurt to accept what one has long denied. For 
example, some women in our class for the first time begin to believe 
the social world they live in disadvantages them. Righteous indigna-
tion and sadness are frequent reactions to this loss of innocence. As 
McGonigal has put it: 
Transformative learning theory also recognizes that changing one’s perspec-
tive is not simply a rational process. Being forced to consider, evaluate, and 
revise underlying assumptions can be an emotionally charged experience. 
Students have successfully used their current paradigms to excel in school 
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and understand the world. They may reasonably be reluctant to abandon what 
they believe is the right way to think, create, and solve problems. Resistance 
to perspective transformation is common, even among students who are 
motivated to learn.10
When evaluative learning places something as intimate as a student’s 
self-conception in the balance, teachers can anticipate some retrench-
ment.
Students learning evaluatively may “shut down” or stop evaluat-
ing and retreat into pre-existing understandings. For some students 
the cognitive dissonance generated in our course is difficult to handle 
cognitively and emotionally. Sometimes it is too much to handle be-
cause it happens too quickly. Other times the unlearning required to 
reachieve coherence would be too disruptive to a student’s life and no 
amount of time is enough. Of course, some amount of retreat can be 
healthy.11 Most of us need periods of peace when experiencing turmoil. 
Indeed, we are careful to not push too hard on certain students, espe-
cially when they (sometimes unintentionally) reveal to us the dangers 
they face at home. Yet long-standing retrenchment is the absence of 
learning. (Again, retrenchment must be distinguished from confirmative 
learning. Long standing commitment to a position reaffirmed through 
confirmative learning is not retrenchment.) We push for learning and 
thus tend to allow only temporary retrenchment. 
Beyond retrenchment, misinterpretation of new ideas can be com-
mon when a nuanced and accurate understanding of a newly expe-
rienced idea would generate a need for substantial transformative 
unlearning of dearly held pre-existing understandings but a rough 
understanding would not generate much felt incoherence. Without 
much cognitive dissonance, many of the women in our class accept 
that many relationships in which women participate are sexist. When 
pressed to examine whether the features of the sexist relationships they 
have studied are found in their own relationships some of these same 
students balk. Such students cannot transfer or apply what they have 
learned. While such students understand aspects of sexist relationships 
in the abstract they have not understood them fully. Another absence 
of full understanding occurs when students gloss nuance. When idea 
A1 fits well within one’s current conceptual scheme and idea A2 does 
not, a learner may mistakenly take idea A2 to be A1. The subtler the 
distinction between A2 and A1 and the more disquieting A2 but com-
fortable A1 is for a student, the more likely it is that a student will 
mistake idea A2 for A1.
Our understanding of transformative unlearning of dearly held pre-
existing understandings inspires us to interact compassionately with 
students to empower them to meet our demand for on-going, appro-
priately nuanced learning. We often choose to view student glossing 
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of nuance not as a lack of effort, laziness, or willful inattention but 
as an understandable part of the process of transformative unlearning. 
Rather than thinking of them as combative, we try to coax “shut down” 
or disgruntled students out of temporary moments of understandable 
retrenchment. For example, outside of class we talk privately with 
students about their emotional responses to the concepts found in the 
texts (ready to make referrals if our expertise is exhausted). We assign 
homework that allows them to prepare what they will say in class. We 
help students develop ideas and arguments that are at odds with the 
texts. A full account of our coaxing pedagogies are explained in the 
“Embodied, Learning-Centered Pedagogy and Narrative” section below, 
but before moving to that discussion we must complete our attempt to 
understand student experience by reflecting on transgression.
Transgression and Learning
Paradigmatically, to transgress is to flout a valued norm in such a way 
as to threaten the viability of the norm. As such, whether an experi-
ence, act, practice, institution, piece of course content, or person is 
transgressive is context dependent; there are many types of norms and 
many ways to flout them. As is evaluative learning, transgression is a 
matter of degree both quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively, 
a teacher, student, text, idea, or pedagogy may flout many or few 
norms. Qualitatively, a teacher, student, text, idea, or pedagogy may 
flout a norm that is unimportant relative to various cultural, institu-
tional, and personal norms. Alternatively, the transgression may be 
centrally important to a person, institution, or culture. Our concern 
is with those transgressions that are individually phenomenologically 
(especially emotionally, cognitively, and socially) significant. Cartesian 
skepticism is transgressive in the sense that it flouts cultural norms 
about the nature of knowledge. Yet many students experience Cartesian 
skepticism as a temporary annoyance in philosophy class, merely a 
philosopher’s game, but not as something important that requires any 
changes in how to live or conceive of one’s life. Most of the students 
in our feminist ethics and epistemology course tend to experience the 
texts they read as highly important; most of our students’ core under-
standings of themselves and their social worlds are troubled by the 
ideas they encounter in our course.12 
When ideas found in texts are transgressive of cultural norms, we 
find that they exacerbate the retrenchment and misinterpretation as-
sociated with the flouting of personal norms constitutive of highly 
transformative learning. The learning challenges of personal trans-
gression are heightened when the learning also constitutes a cultural 
transgression. Our experience confirms a more general version of a 
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quip in Sinclair’s I, Candidate for Governor: And How I Got Licked: 
“It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary 
depends on him not understanding it.”13 It is hard to get a student to 
understand something when her/his social and material world will be 
disrupted if s/he understands it. Student retrenchment and misinterpre-
tation should not surprise teachers when there are social (e.g., losing 
old friends) and/or material (e.g., parents refusing to pay for college) 
penalties for understanding, speaking of, and/or living consistently 
with newly unlearned and culturally transgressive understandings (e.g., 
that many heterosexual norms are exploitative). As Marilyn Frye has 
put it: “people cannot be persuaded of things they are not ready to be 
persuaded of; there are certain complexes of will and prior experience 
which will inevitably block persuasion, no matter the merits of the 
case presented.”14
Further, we believe a failure to understand is not always the product 
of understandable machinations of the will or mere inattention. Igno-
rance of norms can be actively produced and maintained.15 Sometimes 
a norm is difficult to examine because it is highly complex and widely 
dispersed (e.g., women performing more labor in the home than men). 
Other times a norm is difficult to examine because part of its nature 
is to be enigmatic (e.g., various norms regarding the erotic). Focus-
ing attention on norms that function as if they were designed to be 
inscrutable represents a unique form of transgression. One reason for 
thinking that a norm is a member of the set “norms that a culture re-
ally does not want analyzed” is that it is difficult to identify. A second 
reason to think that a norm is very important in and to a culture is 
that the emotional, social, and material penalties for analyzing it are 
severe. To consider various understandings of our social world, we 
strive to have our students analyze enigmatic norms or marginalized 
and/or popularly vilified beliefs and values even though doing so can 
incur social and material penalties. For example, the students in our 
feminist ethics and epistemology course study the social production 
of ignorance regarding female sexual gratification as example and 
reinscription of sexual inequality. Judging by the reaction of some of 
our colleagues, the role ignorance of female orgasm plays in sustaining 
sexist relationships and larger sexist institutions, and how we ought to 
behave in light of this norm, is a serious transgression or focusing of 
attention where our culture really does not want attention focused.16 
By embodying transgression in a discussion of something many people 
in our culture would not want discussed, we allow students to learn 
about the epistemology and ethics of transgression, which is part of 
the subject matter of the course.
To bring together what has been said so far: We are not surprised 
that many of the students in our feminist ethics and epistemology 
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course retrench and miss nuance since they are engaged in analysis 
of hegemonic norms (this act of analysis often itself a transgression) 
and many are undergoing highly transformative unlearning. However, 
we believe that teachers are obligated not to allow most students (e.g., 
those who will not be significantly harmed by unlearning) to perma-
nently retrench or attain merely rough understandings; teachers have 
a professional responsibility to insist that most students learn (i.e., do 
not retrench) and learn accurately (i.e., appreciate nuance) even when 
learning is transgressing and highly transformative. We do not intend 
to make the students in our feminist ethics and epistemology class 
uncomfortable. Our aim for students is common enough. We hope for 
them to be able to accurately articulate the views found in the texts 
we assign and then analyze the merits of those views with no more 
propensity toward a conservation of pre-existing understandings than 
they would have if the material were not transgressive and inspiring 
of transformative unlearning. But we are not surprised that many of 
our students are uncomfortable and behave in ways that others may 
interpret as combativeness or laziness. Our students are not actively 
trying to avoid learning (by being disruptive) nor are they disposed 
to not put in appropriate effort. They are experiencing unusually high 
amounts of incoherence between their pre-existing understandings 
and the new ideas they encounter in our class. Our practical question 
is: How can we make it as likely as possible that students will ac-
curately learn and evaluate, knowing full well that many of them will 
misinterpret central transgressive ideas, retrench because of the costs 
of transformative learning, or both? 
Unjustified Resistance: Problematic Advocating 
versus Insisting On Evaluative Learning
Before answering the question posed at the end of the last section 
with a description and analysis of some of our pedagogical choices, 
let us rebut a potential objection. One student and a small number of 
colleagues have worried that we problematically advocate an illiberal 
feminist worldview, that we are indoctrinators as opposed to teachers. 
The fact that this objection still arises with regard to feminist ideas 
and not the ideas of, say, Socrates, supports our claim that feminist 
philosophy remains transgressive in a way that quite a bit of other 
philosophy does not. Our response is three-fold.
First, the free exchange of minority views plays a crucial role in a 
free society. We believe that there are widespread racist, sexist, classist, 
etc. norms in current U.S. culture and that these norms are endorsed 
and reinscribed with ubiquitous regularity. We believe that not only is 
it unproblematic to attend directly to critical analyses of these disad-
186 DAVID W. CONCEPCIÓN AND JULI THORSON EFLIN
vantaging norms, but also that it is ethically and politically meritorious 
to engage in such scrutiny. As Harry Brod has put it: “Given prevalent 
racism and sexism . . . given the students’ existing prejudices, the 
teacher’s neutrality is not an alternative to their prejudices on social 
issues, it rather allows their perpetuation.”17 Our course is part of a 
remedy to, not an exacerbation of, an illiberal lack of parity in the 
consideration of reasonable views.
It may be further objected that the feminist views found in the texts 
we teach are not among the set of reasonable beliefs. Obviously, we 
disagree. However, the objection that the content we teach should not be 
taught is distinct from the objection that we teach in an indoctrinating 
manner, and we will not here address the objection that the content we 
teach should not be given hearing in colleges and universities.
Second, all teachers advocate. At a minimum, the texts a teacher 
assigns reveal that teacher’s belief that some ideas are more worthy 
of study than others. We assume that the advocacy of certain ideas as 
more worthy of study than others implicit in faculty selection of texts 
is not only unproblematic but also a professional responsibility. Further, 
we believe even the most scrupulously bland pedagogue teaches from 
a specific point of view that dialectically evolves from and fosters a 
particular worldview. It is thus true of us, as it is for all teachers, that 
we advocate in a way. Fortunately, given its impossibility, non-advocacy 
need not be a teacher’s goal. What is necessary is openness to dis-
sent, a robust openness that carefully attends to subtle differences in 
power that can shut down dissent even when a teacher has a subjective 
commitment to openness. Critics must show not merely that teachers 
targeting evaluative learning of transgressive topics advocate, but that 
they advocate in a problematically intolerant manner.18 
Third, and most importantly, our insistence on accurate evaluative 
learning of transgressive topics is not problematically intolerant. Be-
cause (i) most of the students in our feminist ethics and epistemology 
course dearly hold beliefs that cannot cohere with many of the ideas 
found in the texts we assign and (ii) the “ways of being” recommended 
in the texts we assign transgress many of the norms most of our 
students enter the course living and believing, evaluative learning is 
unavoidable for most of them. What is crucial here is that students do 
the evaluating. Each student determines whether, and to what degree, 
the product of her/his evaluative learning is confirmative (where s/he 
rejects the accurately understood new ideas) or transformative (where 
s/he abandons or revises pre-existing beliefs). We do not coerce them 
to agree with us. We do not always agree with each other. Far from 
being intolerant of it, we encourage students to disagree with us.19
Nevertheless it is true that very few of our students experience 
confirmation, most of them experience transformation, and a few ex-
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perience a paradigm shift toward an acceptance of feminist ideas by 
term’s end. But this result speaks not to advocacy on our part, as if 
we were that persuasive. Rather, it reflects our insistence on accurate 
interpretations of the texts and unwillingness to allow permanent re-
trenchment in most students, students’ earnest evaluative learning in 
light of their pre-existing understandings, and the power of the ideas 
found in the texts we assign. 
It may be objected that the response in the previous paragraphs is 
inadequate, for we do not allow most of the students in our feminist 
ethics and epistemology course to do something many of them would 
like to do (i.e., retrench) and many of them end up self-identifying 
as feminists like us. A critic may argue that if this is not problematic 
advocacy then nothing is. 
Yet such a critic underplays the possibility of confirmation and the 
crucial student agency in the learning process. Each student decides 
for her/himself how s/he will (re)achieve a comfortable level of felt 
coherence within her/his belief and value set. We frequently make sure 
that students notice and evaluate when there is incoherence between 
their pre-existing understandings and an accurate version of the ideas 
we present. We do insist on accuracy and allow only temporary re-
trenchment in most students. We do push students to articulate their 
pre-existing understandings and evaluate them. We do not require any 
particular resolution of that incoherence. The product of some students’ 
evaluation may be a confirmation that rejects the ideas we present or 
a transformation away from the ideas covered in the texts we use. The 
result of a student’s evaluative learning depends on which pre-existing 
understandings that student has and which arguments are most compel-
ling to that student. 
Embodied, Learning-Centered Pedagogy and Narrative
Let us now return to the practical question: Given that (i) teachers have 
a professional responsibility to insist that students learn accurately, (ii) 
the great majority of students in our feminist ethics and epistemology 
course will learn transformatively, and (iii) misinterpretation and non-
learning (i.e., retrenchment) are likely in transformative learning, espe-
cially transformative learning that is transgressive, which pedagogies, 
assessment tools, and content should we employ? When course content 
makes predominantly additive learning impossible for the students at 
hand, since the ideas conveyed in texts do not cohere with the dearly 
held beliefs and values of most of one’s students, we recommend that 
teachers employ pedagogy that makes the students’ revision of their 
pre-existing understandings as emotionally and socially bearable as 
possible while simultaneously ensuring that the students understand 
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the new material as accurately as possible. We recommend embodied, 
learning-centered pedagogy and the use of narrative.
We understand pedagogy to be learning-centered when its primary 
attention is to the experience students have; learning-centered peda-
gogues think most about how they will get students to do things that 
are valuable for the students to do.20 How students grow from doing 
is fundamental. A learning-centered pedagogue understands lecturing 
to be a behavior of a teacher. The student learning behavior during a 
lecture is listening.21 As will become clearer below in our discussion 
of examples, our pedagogy is embodied in that students participate in 
exercises wherein they live, and do not merely get told about or discuss, 
the relevant ideas. We have found that performing ideas found in texts 
gives students a grounding that reduces retrenchment and misunder-
standing. We also encourage students to reflect upon and speak from 
their life experiences since most of them have lived enough to learn 
deeply, if only they would rely on their lives as data to be analyzed 
by the theories we discuss. 
Content
Since content influences pedagogy we should begin by noting that the 
textual backbone of our course is Marilyn Frye’s The Politics of Real-
ity: Essays in Feminist Theory.22 We assign articles addressing similar 
themes to be read in concert with each chapter in Frye’s book. To 
greatly oversimplify, the final chapter of The Politics of Reality con-
tains a stage allegory where patriarchal loyalists (re)enact a reality for 
the “king” who symbolizes all those who largely accept the dominant 
patriarchal worldview and whose vision defines the limits of “the real.” 
What the king does not see is not part of patriarchal reality, even if it 
is real in some other sense. Insofar as the work of stagehands is made 
invisible, stagehands cease to exist in the king’s constructed reality. 
Of course the king’s vision is incomplete, his conceptual scheme 
“gappy.” But those who can see into and/or from (some of) these 
cognitive gaps or negative metaphysical-cum-semantic spaces, exist as 
maverick perceivers. There are also people who are not in the theater, 
who exist completely separately from the king’s reality. Each social 
position represented in this allegory (e.g., king, performing loyalist, 
partially erased but essential devotee, maverick perceiver, and person 
altogether excluded from that which is deemed meaningful) has ethical 
and epistemological opportunities and responsibilities concerning rela-
tionships to each other and the king’s construction, perhaps especially 
with regard to the ignorance the king requires of us concerning what is 
beyond his reality. In short, Frye’s analysis of a central allegory does 
not disentangle metaphysics (What is real or made real?), epistemology 
(What can be known from where?), and ethics (How ought we behave, 
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given where and what we are?). As such, to accurately represent the 
text we needed to keep intermingled the metaphysical, epistemologi-
cal, and ethical aspects of the phenomena Frye examines. We needed 
to help our students (1) simultaneously grapple with metaphysical, 
epistemological, and ethical concerns and (2) break through predict-
able conceptual and emotional barriers to accurately identifying and 
evaluating the relevant ideas. 
Pedagogical Examples 
We enact a version of the stage allegory as our first act on the first 
day of class because we want it to inform many of the discussions we 
build throughout the semester. We walk in and divide the students into 
three groups. Dave takes one group into the hall, telling them only that 
there is something going on inside the room. Juli guides one group 
(with accommodation for students with reduced mobility) onto tables, 
turns off the classroom lights, and directs the light of two overhead 
projectors at them, telling them only that they are on stage. Juli has the 
third group stand in the dark corners of the room behind the light of 
the projectors. We ask three questions and students are told to record 
their answers: From your position, What can you perceive? What do 
you know? How are you expected to behave? After giving students 
some time to record their thoughts, we have the groups change posi-
tions so that each group experiences being on stage (i.e., seeing the 
world as a performing loyalist), in the shadows (i.e., seeing the world 
as a partially erased but essential devotee), and outside (i.e., seeing 
the world as a person altogether excluded from that which is deemed 
meaningful by the king). We limit to three the positions we would have 
students experience on the first day so that the power relations stand 
out clearly. This is an embodied exercise because the students bodily 
experience all three standpoints.
One important result of this embodied exercise is that in exploring 
standpoints students spontaneously generate many of the ideas that we 
return to and refine throughout the semester. Their narratives describe 
how they feel. When on the tables, they feel they need to perform and 
that there are rules about how their performances should unfold. They 
feel bad because they do not know how to perform well in this setting. 
They clearly see the fellow students on the tables, but they cannot see 
anyone else clearly. The students in the corners are just vague human 
shapes. The students outside of the room, “Well, they didn’t matter at 
all” one stage-bound student said. From the shadowy corner, students 
clearly see the others in the light and though less clearly they also 
see the students standing with them in the dark corners. They report 
that they feel that they are expected to passively but attentively watch 
the performers. Without being instructed to do so they look for op-
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portunities to offer assistance, such as helping the performers get up 
and down from the tables safely. They are curious about the students 
outside even though all they can see is an occasional face in the win-
dow of the door. The students in the hall are mad. They want to know 
what is going on in the room. Especially for the first group, they want 
to know why they were selected for negative, exclusionary treatment 
when clearly they had done nothing to deserve it, particularly because 
it is clear to them that what is happening in the room is important. 
One or two brave souls usually peek through the small window in the 
door, but their fellow outsiders tell them that they should not do that. 
Some consider rebellion, suggesting that they just walk in and disrupt 
what is happening in the room. 
Among the ideas nascent in these responses that we return to 
throughout the term are: (1) inclusiveness and standpoint are impor-
tant when attempting to discern what is known and knowable, (2) 
responsibilities and obligations appear to be context dependent, (3) 
outsiders know that doing right relative to their role as it is currently 
defined by the privileged means keeping their place and missing out 
on something valuable, and (4) outsiders and shadow people know 
things that people in the light do not know. In short, students discover 
that different social positioning provides unique epistemological and 
ethical advantages and disadvantages. Further, some students who 
identify themselves as people of privilege notice some limitations of 
their perspective and some students who identify as non-privileged 
find that their experience of marginalization will be acknowledged and 
treated as worthy of study in this class. We count it as a significant 
success of this exercise that students engage these ideas on the first 
day without having done any reading. 
This “standpoint” exercise also produces a valuable tension. Many 
students come to our class believing in absolute moral rules. On the 
first day they discover that often rightness and wrongness appear to 
be contextualized. They want to relieve this tension. They want to 
re-establish coherence lost between their beliefs and their standpoint 
learning experience. Since they now recognize that some of their 
pre-existing beliefs and values might not be acceptable on their own 
standards, our students have something very personal at stake in this 
class. Put alternatively, we put them into a concrete, albeit contrived, 
situation that instills a desire to engage discomforting material since 
the engagement promises to alleviate some now felt tension.
A second, “separatism,” pedagogy we employ in this course also 
connects content to a lived in-class learning experience to overcome 
predictable barriers to engagement. On the days we discuss sexual 
assault, separatism, and ignorance regarding female orgasm we have 
only men in one room and only women in another.23 The first and third 
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separations are, given the topics of sexual assault and orgasm, primarily 
to open lines of inquiry that are difficult in a multi-sex environment. 
During the sexual assault separation the women have discussed dif-
ficulties regarding what society expects and allows of their bodies and 
sexual behavior. One year, they told the least heterosexually experi-
enced woman in the class that she was the lucky one among them. The 
discussion is always frank, intimate, and fun. The men have wondered 
if some of their past behavior constitutes sexual assault. During the 
“ignorance of women’s orgasm” separation one of the men observed that 
this is another situation where “guys don’t ask for directions.” The men 
have tended to discuss whom their ignorance tends to advantage. The 
women have tended to talk about how extensive the knowledge of male, 
and limited the knowledge of female, gratification is in current U.S. 
culture. They observe how difficult it would be to discuss or change 
their relationship to sexual pleasure with their current partners. 
The topic of female orgasm represents a special transgression. Once 
the notion of transgression itself becomes a topic of explicit discus-
sion we want students to experience an obvious transgression. If it 
is a norm that certain ideas not be discussed in a classroom setting, 
beyond a denuded discussion in a health course, then assigning and 
discussing texts containing these ideas is an instance of transgressive 
teaching. We assume it is uncontroversial to assert that a presentation 
of ideas regarding the social construction of ignorance regarding female 
orgasm is widely held not to be an appropriate topic in a university 
philosophy course. By living a transgression we embody the course 
topic of transgression. 
The second separation exercise, where we explicitly discuss separat-
ism, is aimed directly at embodying the course material. When sepa-
rated to discuss separatism the women have not talked about the men 
beyond noting that it is a relief to have them out of the room so that 
the women can really talk. The men initially discuss other male-only 
circumstances they had experienced. The conversation moves from de-
scriptions of group viewing of pornography to moments when other men 
in authority had shamed them for their lack of masculinity and finally 
to naïve musing about what the women must be talking about. 
One year, when Dave knocked on the door to see if the women were 
ready to reconvene the class as a whole, he was sent packing with a 
jovial chorus of “get out!” Once we do reconvene each group reports 
some of what they discussed. The women have sometimes chosen not 
to report some of what they discuss. The men find this reduction in 
access frustrating. The women’s choice to reduce the men’s access and 
the men’s reaction to this reduction are among the topics we hope to 
discuss when evaluating separatism. Nevertheless, the women always 
tell the men in no uncertain terms how nice it is to have a chance to 
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talk, for the men suck all the conversational oxygen from the room. 
The men, some for the first time, become aware of the fact that they 
tend to take more than their fair share of class time and that doing so 
has a silencing effect on women, even in a class on feminist ethics 
and epistemology. Two related matters are especially important here. 
First, there is never a single remark about man-hating, anti-liberal, or 
exclusivist women made by anyone in the class during the discussion 
of radical feminist separatism. Second, the women find their separa-
tion empowering. They have fun, are more open, and return to the full 
class meeting with an agenda—to tell the men something about class 
dynamics that likely they would not have said had they not had time 
to discuss it without men around. To paraphrase Zora Neale Hurston, 
the women loved themselves when they were laughing and then again 
when they were looking mean and impressive.24 Albeit from many dif-
ferent angles, each student lives the value of a room of one’s own, the 
value of empowering separatism as opposed to the destructive power 
of segregation.25
The ability to have faculty guided single-sex discussions is a spe-
cial merit of our class, since it is team-taught by one woman and one 
man. Nevertheless, if one has a helpful colleague or graduate student, 
discussion groups separated along any diversity/identity-axis could be 
employed even if one teaches a class on her/his own. It is also unusual 
for a class on a feminist topic to have a male professor. We were able 
to upend both the expectation of some women that a male professor 
could not know anything about feminism and the expectation of some 
men that a female professor would be biased. More importantly, since 
we aim for the students in our feminist ethics and epistemology class 
to experience course content from the inside rather than as observers, 
we professionally immerse ourselves as well. For example, when dis-
cussing the relationship between body comportment and power Juli, the 
department chair, demonstrates how she “stands like a lady” (tightly 
compacted) in certain settings and how she stands aggressively (feet 
firmly planted, hands on hips, elbows out) when talking with other 
university officials.
Our relationship as co-teachers also exposes power dynamics. 
Students wonder why the junior male professor often talks more than 
the senior female professor: “Shouldn’t the female professor be talk-
ing more in a feminism class?” We are pleased that the students in 
our feminist ethics and epistemology course challenged us with this 
question for two reasons. First, we were able to explicitly address an 
assumption many of our students have about who can know what. Cer-
tainly Juli has some experiential knowledge that Dave cannot have (as 
Dave has some that Juli cannot). But as it turns out, Dave has a stronger 
background in feminist philosophy than did Juli. And Juli had other 
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leadership responsibilities that meant Dave had a greater share of some 
course responsibilities. Second, that our students ask such a question 
demonstrates that we succeed in subverting a typical student-teacher 
power dynamic where the teacher constantly critiques the student but 
the student is not allowed to critique the teacher. 
Opening ourselves to students’ critiques of our pedagogy generates 
another connection between lived experience and course content. This 
sort of “leading by example,” where we are out of our comfort zone, 
appears to have helped students understand some of the difficulties they 
were having. An example of the sort of activity we used to undermine 
the typical classroom power dynamic that probably contributes to the 
students in our feminist ethics and epistemology course becoming 
comfortable enough to openly criticize our pedagogical practice is 
found in our giving up the chalk. 
Borrowing a practice of Claudia Card, some class discussions are 
managed by “passing the chalk.” To speak a person must be holding 
a piece of chalk, a symbol of power in the classroom. No one other 
than the person holding the chalk may speak, including Juli and Dave. 
If a person wishes to speak, including Juli and Dave, s/he must raise 
her hand and hope that the chalk holder gives her/him the chalk. Dave 
finds the moments when we use this pedagogy especially difficult. 
In addition to “passing the chalk” we use other inclusive pedagogi-
cal maneuvers to embody content as we aim for evaluative learning. 
One year we threw a football to each other and observed students’ 
body comportment in the student union before discussing Iris Marion 
Young’s “Throwing Like A Girl.”26 We use our own lives as examples 
when lecturing on such topics as anger and integrity, inviting students 
to tell their own stories. We read Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s feminist 
utopian novel Herland in an attempt to think ourselves out of the 
dominant conceptual scheme.27 Reflection upon these innovations, the 
two learning-centered pedagogies described in detail above, and our 
other attempts to teach creatively, we derive the following observa-
tions that should be relevant to anyone aiming for evaluative and often 
transformative learning of transgressive topics. 
First, when new ideas that create cognitive dissonance in students 
are also transgressive, there are special difficulties and opportunities. 
The emotional and social disquiet can lead to attempts at permanent 
retrenchment and misunderstanding of details. Yet the desire to resolve 
the dissonance provides an intrinsic motivation for students to engage 
material that is emotionally difficult if it is promised that the material 
has something to say about the disquiet they are experiencing. 
Second, when separating metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical 
issues is tantamount to misrepresenting a text, in courses where the 
material is covered iteratively folding back on and building up from 
194 DAVID W. CONCEPCIÓN AND JULI THORSON EFLIN
earlier lessons, it is useful to allow students to live the idea. Using in-
class activities and ourselves as examples can make accessible material 
that is at once ethics and epistemology without artificially separating 
the issues. Learning-centered experiences that are carefully selected 
to inspire students to ask questions, as opposed to pedagogy that lists 
answers, prepares students to engage deeply. 
Third, embodied experiences makes evaluative learning nearly un-
avoidable. Rather than merely talking at them or having them talk with 
each other, we immerse students in learning activities that allowed them 
to feel, many for the first time, the depth of the ideas and questions 
about responsibility, understanding, and social construction that they 
only discuss at a distance or as observers in other classes. The depth 
of their learning reveals itself in various ways. For example, usually 
several of our students’ primary romantic relationships are profoundly 
changed. Having become maverick perceivers to some degree they 
simply can no longer live as they once had.
Fourth, it is important to stress that course content determines the 
best embodied learning experience. Our separatism and standpoint ac-
tivities would not be appropriate in many courses, although analogous 
experiences should be highly beneficial to students. 
Fifth, metacognitive engagement, or engagement in an awareness 
of one’s engagement, increases retention and depth of understanding.28 
Thinking about what one is learning by thinking about how course ma-
terial is related to an experience a person is currently having tends to 
increase learning that stays with students. A further merit of embodied 
pedagogies is that it is very easy to be metacognitive about them.
In the end, to varying degrees, and in diverse ways, most of the 
students in our feminist ethics and epistemology course spent some 
time as “maverick perceivers,” those who can see into and/or from as-
pects of reality not countenanced by the dominant conceptual scheme. 
Upon appreciating the injustice of the king’s construction of reality, 
many of our students would no longer see as the king wants them to 
see. They learned, again with quite a bit of individual variation and 
success, to lovingly travel to and from some of the cognitive gaps that 
prior to class they did not know existed.29 And they learned a bit of 
humility in their recognition that there are likely many more worlds 
they cannot yet imagine that are occupied by real others. Our students’ 
ability to empathically imagine standpoints other than their own grows. 
The students in our feminist ethics and epistemology course find that 
their increased sensitivity brings with it new ethical obligations that 
are difficult to fulfill. Indeed, we had to “go off syllabus” one day to 
begin to show our students how to handle the new moral emotions 
(e.g., anger and guilt) they were experiencing. We believe the students 
in our feminist ethics and epistemology course would not have been 
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so moved had we not designed learning activities that immersed them 
in the content. Our experience suggests that learning about something 
from within can be more powerful than learning about it as an ob-
server. Especially when material is emotionally challenging and the 
learning is highly transformative, carefully constructed lived learning 
experiences that embody content can overcome emotional, social, and 
conceptual barriers.
Conclusion
Our experience shows us the merits of a learning-centered approach to 
identifying powerful embodied experiences that foster accurate identi-
fication of nuanced ideas and deeply evaluative learning. We find that 
embodied learning experiences motivate students to push beyond the 
disquiet associated with the examination of transgressive topics. Our 
students confront who they are, what they can know given their posi-
tion in an arrogating power structure, and what society expects them 
to be. The students in our feminist ethics and epistemology course, 
again to various degrees and in different ways, feel the course content. 
We end with one caution: It takes courage to teach the way we do, to 
expose what we do to our students (about themselves, ourselves, and 
our shared reality) in this class.30 We were lucky to have each other’s 
support through the process. Nevertheless, we find the risk worth it, for 
we receive the reward of having students tell us that we have changed 
their lives for the better.31
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